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Abstract
Behaviorism has argued that behavior is the 
Psyche and the subject matter of psychology. 
Although, some scientists had done empirical 
work with objective methods before 1913, the 
year in which John B. Watson published his 
manifesto, he was the first one to attempt a sys-
tematization of behavior as the Psyche, that is, as 
psychology’s subject matter. In this text, I out-
line Watson’s notion of behavior to compare it 
with two other forms of behaviorism: Skinner’s 
radical behaviorism and molar behaviorism. The 
purpose of the paper is to illustrate how the con-
cept of behavior has been and is changing. 
Keywords: behaviorism, John B. Watson, behav-
ior, psyche. 
Resumen
Según el conductismo, el comportamiento cons-
tituye la Psique y el tema de estudio de la psicolo-
gía. Aunque algunos científicos habían realizado 
trabajos empíricos con métodos objetivos antes 
de 1913, año en el que John B. Watson publicó 
su manifiesto, este último fue el primero en in-
tentar la sistematización de la conducta como 
equivalente a la Psique, esto es, como el objeto 
de estudio de la psicología. El artículo discute 
la noción de comportamiento de Watson y la 
compara con otras dos formas de conductismo: 
el conductismo radical de Skinner y el conduc-
tismo molar, con el fin de ilustrar la forma en que 
el concepto de comportamiento ha cambiado y 
sigue cambiando.
Palabras clave: conductismo, John B. Watson, 
comportamiento, psique. 
Resumo
Segundo o condutismo, o comportamento cons-
titui a Psique e o tema de estudo da psicologia. 
Embora alguns científicos tivessem realizado 
trabalhos empíricos com métodos objetivos an-
tes de 1913, ano em que John B. Watson publi-
cou seu manifesto, este último foi o primeiro em 
tentar a sistematização da conduta como equi-
valente à Psique, isto é, como objeto de estudo 
da psicologia. Neste artigo, discute-se a noção 
de comportamento de Watson ao compará-la 
com outras duas formas de condutismo: o con-
dutismo radical de Skinner e o condutismo mo-
lar, com o objetivo de ilustrar a forma na qual o 
conceito de comportamento mudou e continua 
mudando.
Palavras-chave: condutismo, John B. Watson, 
comportamento, Psique. 
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The Psyche as Behavior: From 
Watson to Modern Behaviorism 
There is no need for controversy about 
what psychologists study. As the word implies, 
they study the Psyche. However, there is room 
for controversy about what the Psyche is. For 
instance, some dictionaries, introductory texts, 
and the American Psychological Association 
(2013) define psychology as the “science of mind 
and behavior” (see for instance, the Merriam-
Webster Dictionary, 2013), which implies that 
the Psyche is composed of both, mind and be-
havior. Nevertheless, given that some authors 
define psychology as the study of mind (Gard-
ner, 1987; Rivière, 1998) whereas others define it 
as the study of behavior (Baum, 1994; Skinner, 
1938, 1953; Watson, 1913, 1930), and that those 
definitions are incompatible, to say that psychol-
ogy is the science of mind or behavior would be 
more appropriate. Of course, many other enti-
ties, from the subconscious mind to social rep-
resentations, seem suitable candidates for the 
Psyche, but most of them are just expressions of 
mind or behavior. 
Behaviorism is the movement that has 
argued for behavior as the Psyche, or subject 
matter of psychology. According to the Merri-
am-Webster Dictionary (2013), behaviorism is 
“a school of psychology that takes the objective 
evidence of behavior (as measured responses to 
stimuli) as the only concern of its research and 
the only basis of its theory without reference to 
conscious experience”, and according to the En-
cyclopedia Britannica (2013): 
Behaviorism was a highly influential academic 
school of psychology that dominated psycho-
logical theory between the two world wars. 
Classical  behaviorism, prevalent in the first 
third of the 20th century, was concerned ex-
clusively with measurable and observable data 
and excluded ideas, emotions, and the consid-
eration of inner mental experience and activity 
in general (para. 1). 
Later, the Encyclopedia Britannica added,
A derivative form of classical  behavior-
ism known as neobehaviorism evolved from 1930 
through the late 1940s. In this approach, psychol-
ogists attempted to translate the general meth-
odology prescribed by Watson into a detailed, 
experimentally based theory of adaptive behav-
ior. This era was dominated by  learning  theo-
rists  Clark L. Hull  and  B.F. Skinner; Skinner’s 
thought was the direct descendant of Watson’s 
intellectual heritage and became dominant in 
the field after the mid-1950s. Other important 
behaviorists included Hull-influenced  Kenneth 
W. Spence;  Neal Miller…  Edward C. Tolman; 
and Edwin R. Guthrie (para. 2).
Watson (1913, 1930), successful or not in his 
endeavor, was the first to openly argue for a psy-
chology in which behavior was the Psyche. Ac-
tually, Watson (1913, 1930) was not the founder 
of behaviorism. As Wozniak (1997) argued, by 
1913, when Watson delivered his “manifesto”, 
behaviorism was 40 years old. However, his in-
fluence in popularizing and making a case for 
behaviorism is undeniable. As his manifesto is 
a historical reference, I will use it as a departure 
point to examine how the notion of behavior 
has been changing since Watson introduced his 
behaviorism. It is important to review Watson’s 
ideas because later authors distorted or misin-
terpreted them, which also entails a distortion of 
behaviorism in general. For instance, contrary to 
what the Encyclopedia Britannica (2013) asserts 
in the quote above, ideas and emotions were 
key aspects in Watson’s behaviorisms. Next, 
I will outline some of Watson’s ideas and later 
compare them to those of two other versions of 
behaviorism: Skinner’s behaviorism and molar 
behaviorism. I must stress that my intention is 
just to illustrate how the notion of behavior has 
been changing. There are many others forms 
of behaviorism (see O’Donohue & Kitchener, 
1999), and molar behaviorism is not necessarily 
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going to replace the traditional forms of radical 
behaviorism. It is also worth noting that this es-
say is intended for general psychologists rather 
than for behavior analysts and people well-in-
formed on behaviorism.
Behavior in Watson’s Behaviorism 
As Wozniak (1997) pointed out, by the time 
Watson (1913) published his manifesto, several 
researchers, such as Douglas Alexander Spald-
ing and Charles Darwin, had conducted studies 
with human and nonhuman animals employing 
objective methods. Nevertheless, nobody had 
systematized a psychology in which behavior 
was the subject matter, so Watson’s purpose, 
according to Wozniak (1997), was to supply a 
rationale to legitimate the behavioral methods 
already in use and to justify them as an alterna-
tive to the study of consciousness by the intro-
spective methods in vogue in his time. A key 
issue in Watson’s systematization was his notion 
of behavior, which he defined broadly as “what 
the organism does or says” (Watson, 1930, p. 6). 
Because the definition is very general, it does 
not shed much light on what he understood by 
behavior. However, that understanding emerges 
from a closer look at some of his texts. Watson 
(1913) wrote, 
Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely 
objective experimental branch of natural science. 
Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control 
of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part 
of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its 
data dependent upon the readiness with which 
they lend themselves to interpretation in terms 
of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his efforts 
to get a unitary scheme of animal response, rec-
ognizes no dividing line between man and brute. 
The behavior of man, with all of its refinement 
and complexity, forms only a part of the behav-
iorist’s total scheme of investigation (p. 158).
Defining psychology as an “objective exper-
imental branch of natural science” implies that it 
does not study an extra-natural thing and that 
those who study it must use the same methods 
and logic of the other natural sciences. Hence, 
in Watson’s view, the Psyche, or subject mat-
ter of psychology, was a natural phenomenon. 
William James had argued more than a decade 
before that psychology was a natural science 
(Leahey, 1980). Nevertheless, in James’ view, 
psychology’s subject matter was consciousness, 
and Watson believed that any conception of con-
sciousness, including that of James, was “neither 
a definable nor a usable concept” (Watson, 1930, 
p. 3). Watson’s behaviorism had strong roots in 
Darwinism and functionalism, so his version of 
the Psyche was not exclusive to humans. Since he 
assumed continuity among species, he believed 
that research with other animals would help in 
the understanding of the human Psyche, just as 
research with humans would help in the under-
standing of the other animals’ Psyche. His inter-
est in animal behavior was one of the reasons for 
rejecting “mental states” and “consciousness” as 
the subject matter of psychology; it would not 
be possible to “introspect” the mental states of 
an animal.
According to Watson (1913, 1930), an ob-
server could measure the behavior of another 
organism in physical terms, find the variables 
that regulate its behavior in the environment, 
and describe its behavior in a stimulus-response 
framework. In his view, the behavior of an or-
ganism was a physical phenomenon that con-
sisted of responses to the different forms of 
stimulation in its environment. He defined a re-
sponse as an observable and measureable move-
ment that always involved the whole organism; 
however, the response could be so slight that an 
observer would require instruments to record it 
(Watson, 1930). For instance, a sub-vocal move-
ment would be so small that only instruments 
could detect it, but it would involve the whole 
organism anyway. Each possible stimulus-re-
sponse (S-R) relation was a unit, so that a stimu-
lus could never be dissociated from its response, 
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and a response could never be dissociated from 
the stimulus that caused it. The psychologist’s 
task was to identify the stimulus controlling 
each response. 
Watson (1930) assumed contiguity and im-
mediate efficient causation in each S-R relation 
so that every response was an immediate reac-
tion to a present, effective stimulus. The way in 
which he dealt with apparently delayed respons-
es shows his strong commitment to a strict S-R 
psychology. According to Watson, a response 
that seems to occur a long time after a stimulus 
just results from the accumulation of sequential 
S-R units that altogether conformed a habit. For 
instance, in a situation in which two people in-
terchange the following verbal stimuli:
First person: “Meet me at the Belmont to-
morrow for lunch at one o’clock”.
Second person: “All right, I will be there.” 
If the second person arrives on time, Wat-
son would have argued that it was because of 
the second person’s reapplication of sub-vocal 
stimuli to movement in virtue of verbal habits 
(Watson, 1930). The person would keep telling 
himself, “I must go to my appointment at the 
Belmont.” An important implication of Watson’s 
S-R view is that the organism’s behavior was not 
a continuous variable; in his view, the behavior of 
an organism was composed of discrete S-R units.
In relation to access by an observer, he be-
lieved that responses could be over-explicit or in-
ternal-implicit. Picking up a ball, writing a letter, 
driving an automobile, or flirting with a woman 
exemplified explicit responses which any ob-
server could measure without instruments. The 
stomach contractions of a hungry person, glan-
dular and small muscular movements produced 
by threatening stimuli, or salivation caused by 
certain food items exemplified implicit respons-
es, which an observer could measure only with 
instruments. Both explicit and implicit respons-
es could be produced by external or internal 
stimuli. Punching someone else as a response 
to an insult would be an external response to an 
external stimulus. Calling a doctor as a response 
to the pain produced by an internal lesion would 
be an external response to an internal stimulus. 
Invisible movements in the muscle of a hand 
as a response to an insult would be an internal 
response to an external stimulus. Grinding the 
teeth as a response to an internal lesion would 
be an internal response to an internal stimulus.
In relation to learning, Watson believed 
that responses to stimuli could be innate or 
learned, although he gave more importance to 
the environment as a determinant of behavior. 
He supposed that organisms have a set of un-
learned, reflex responses to few stimuli. The 
size and characteristics of the innate-response 
set would depend on the species. For example, 
humans would have fewer innate and more con-
ditioned responses than insects. The learning 
of fear responses to new stimuli was a frequent 
subject in Watson’s texts. According to him, only 
few stimuli would produce innate fear responses 
in babies. A loud sound was one of them. By pre-
senting a neutral stimulus, like a rabbit, along 
with a loud sound, the rabbit would become 
a conditioned stimulus for the fear response, 
Watson (1930) explained the acquisition of new 
responses with Pavlov’s theory of conditioned 
reflexes. As a matter of fact, Watson and Rayner 
(1920) performed the famous Albert experiment 
in which they created a conditioned response of 
fear to a rabbit in a child. 
According to Watson (1913, 1930), all be-
havior, even feelings and thinking, is just a set 
of learned habits. As Verdu-Rico and Bentes 
de Carvalho-Neto (2010) pointed out, scholars 
may have overlooked and misrepresented Wat-
son’s theories on thinking and language. The 
Encyclopedia Britannica (2013) quote above is 
an example. Bergmann (1956) criticized Wat-
son’s behaviorism on several grounds, and one 
of them was his alleged rejection of a mind or 
mental events. Did Watson deny the existence 
of a mind? Yes, he did. Did Watson deny the 
existence of mental events? As mental, he did. 
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However, he did not deny the existence of psy-
chological events such as thinking or feeling 
and their importance for a natural science of 
behavior. Did he deny subjective experience? 
He did not specifically deny it; he rather implic-
itly accepted its existence because if there is an 
objective experience, necessarily there is also a 
subjective one. He simply did not think that the 
immediate subjective experience had a role in a 
science of behavior. 
Behavior in Skinner’s Radical 
Behaviorism
Now, I will compare the behaviorism of 
Watson with that of Skinner. I must note that it is 
more difficult to portray in a few words the ideas 
of Skinner than those of Watson, which in itself 
shows conceptual progress, so I will contrast the 
views of Watson with an extremely simplified 
version of those of Skinner. The behaviorism of 
Skinner (1938, 1953) was similar to the one that 
Watson proposed in relation to the role of be-
havior in a natural science: both of them argued 
for behavior as the subject matter of psychol-
ogy and the environment as the place to look 
for the causes of behavior. Nevertheless, there 
are more differences than similarities between 
them. As the words stimulus and response are 
frequent in the books and papers that Skinner 
wrote, a person who does not read them care-
fully may conclude erroneously that there were 
no major differences between him and Watson, 
and that Skinner was a typical S-R psychologist. 
The truth is that there are many differences. The 
most significant differences are that Skinner was 
not an S-R psychologist and that he believed 
that a science of behavior must explain subjec-
tive experience. 
In Watson’s (1913, 1930) view, each stimulus 
produced a response, so the environment acted 
on organisms. Organisms reacted by respond-
ing all the time to some stimulus. Each response 
would be a discrete event, but behavior seemed 
continuous due to the amount of stimuli that 
incessantly assailed organisms. Like Watson, 
Skinner assumed that discrete and observable 
responses compose the behavior of an organism. 
Skinner (1938, 1974) acknowledged that Watson’s 
S-R psychology accounted for a small portion of 
behavior, but not for the largest and more signif-
icant part. According to Skinner, the responses 
of organisms could be voluntary-emitted or in-
voluntary-elicited. Classically conditioned and 
reflex responses exemplified elicited behavior. 
As emitted or voluntary behavior composed 
most of mammals’ behavior, Skinner deemed 
insufficient an S-R framework in which behav-
ing is just reacting.
Skinner adopted an R-S framework. He ar-
gued that the stimulus that modifies an emitted 
response is the one that follows it rather than 
the one that antecedes it. For instance, if by 
pressing a lever (R) in a Skinner box, a rat ob-
tains pellets (S), it is more likely that the rat will 
press the lever again. As long as lever-pressing 
results in pellets, the rat will keep pressing it. 
If the rat does not receive any more pellets by 
pressing the lever, lever pressing will decrease 
or disappear. It is evident that no antecedent 
stimulus evokes a lever-pressing response. An 
S-R psychology assumed that the stimulus is an 
efficient cause that evokes, elicits, or produces 
a response. According to Skinner, the stimulus 
selects responses by making more likely those 
that produce reinforcing consequences and less 
likely those that produce punishing or no con-
sequence at all. Skinner himself described his 
causal model as selection by consequences in an 
analogy with Darwin’s explanation of evolution 
(Skinner, 1984).
Although Skinner emphasized the role 
of the consequence, he acknowledged that an-
tecedent stimuli played a role. His framework 
incorporated three terms: an antecedent stim-
ulus (Sd), a response (R), and a reinforcing or 
punishing stimulus (Sr). The position of the 
antecedent stimulus in his Sd-R-Sr scheme may 
mislead a lay reader because it looks like the 
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stimulus in the traditional S-R schema. Accord-
ing to Skinner, however, the antecedent stimulus 
sets the occasion for a response to occur instead 
of evoking it as a stimulus in a reflex does. If the 
rat in the Skinner box obtains pellets by pressing 
the lever only when a green light is on, eventu-
ally the rat will respond only in the presence of 
the green light and hardly ever or never in its 
absence, in which case, researchers say that the 
green light has gained control of the lever press-
ing. When there is no defined Sd, the box, lever, 
or other conditions present during the process 
become the antecedent stimulus. 
Skinner (1938, 1953, 1974) called the relation-
ship among the three elements of his framework 
a three-terms contingency. For instance, the 
contingency for the rat in the Skinner box estab-
lishes that, in the presence of the green light (Sd), 
lever-pressing responses (R) produce (R) food 
pellets (Sr). Like Watson, Skinner assumed that 
the relation between stimuli and responses was 
contiguous in time; for a consequence to modify 
a response, it has to be close in time to the re-
sponse. Other factors affecting the effectiveness 
of a contingency included food deprivation, bio-
logical conditions, and previous history. For in-
stance, the rate of lever pressing is higher after 
longer deprivation periods for healthier than for 
unhealthier rats, and after previous reinforcing 
experiences by pressing the lever. 
The notion of contingency, as a relation 
between environment and organism, was cen-
tral to Skinnerian psychology. In a Skinner box, 
a researcher usually studies one or few contin-
gencies, but other uncontrolled contingencies 
exist. If there is a response, some contingency 
should be controlling it. If, for example, water 
is available ad libitum, the rat will have to go to 
the water dispenser to drink it, so one can say 
that the water reinforces the rat’s displacement 
to the dispenser. In the lab, researchers arrange 
the contingencies. Outside the lab, nature and 
society arrange them. In Watson’s view, the role 
of a behavioral scientist is to identify the stimuli 
that control each response. In contrast, accord-
ing to Skinner and contemporary behavior 
analysts, the role of a behavioral scientist is to 
identify the contingencies that regulate or con-
trol a response.
Arguing that stimuli select responses, like 
Skinner did, implies that organisms respond or 
act continuously. According to Watson, stimuli 
initiated the movements that he called respons-
es. In contrast, according to Skinner, the value 
of what an organism does depends on the con-
tingencies operating in that moment. Hence, for 
Skinner, stimuli did not cause responses; they 
changed responding tendencies. The notion of 
reinforcement as selection by consequences that 
Skinner adopted may appear insufficient to ex-
plain all the complexity of human behavior, but 
that is precisely the point: Darwin explained the 
complexity of evolution with just the concepts 
of variation and selection. On the other hand, 
to account for human behavior, Skinner used 
other concepts besides reinforcement, which I 
left out of the present outline and include rule-
governed behavior (Skinner, 1966), his approach 
to the study of verbal behavior (Skinner, 1957), 
his ideas on education (Skinner, 1958, 1961), and 
cultural change and planning (Skinner, 1999), 
among others. 
Just as the notion of stimulus and its role in 
the explanation of behavior differ a lot in Skin-
ner and Watson, the way in which they dealt with 
the idea of a subjective experience also differs. I 
emphasize that the difference was more in the 
way of dealing with subjective experiences than 
in accepting private events such as feelings in a 
science of behavior. Contrary to what the urban 
myth says, Watson and Skinner thought that 
what in vernacular language people call feelings, 
emotions, and thinking were behavioral phe-
nomena that a science of behavior must explain. 
For instance, Watson devoted two chapters of his 
book Behaviorism to emotions and another two 
chapters to thinking (Watson, 1930), and Skin-
ner discussed the subject in numerous papers 
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and books (see, for instance, Skinner, 1953, 1984). 
Skinner dealt with the so-called emotional life 
better than Watson, but this was because his ap-
proach was better in general, and not because 
Watson denied the existence of feelings and emo-
tions whereas Skinner acknowledged them. 
Accepting that there is a subject that knows 
and an object that can be known implies that hu-
man experience can be objective or subjective. 
In the first case, everybody can share the experi-
ence because it is public and overt for everybody 
to see. For example, the tree that a forgotten 
castaway is seeing on his island at this moment 
is a private experience as long as nobody else 
sees it, but the tree can be the object of a shared 
experience because other persons can see it in 
principle. In contrast, although others can ob-
serve the inflamed tooth of a rescued castaway, 
nobody would ever experience the pain that the 
inflammation causes. The experience of pain 
would be a private subjective event accessible 
only to the person experiencing it. 
Both Skinner and Watson accepted the 
objective-subjective dualism according to which 
there are subjective-private and objective-public 
experiences, but Skinner, in contrast to Watson, 
held that a science of behavior should deal not 
only with objective but also with subjective ex-
periences. As Moore (1995) pointed out, the 
objective-subjective dualism does not entail on-
tological dualism. Skinner (1945, 1989) argued 
that the difference between private and public 
stimuli and responses lies in their accessibility 
and not in their nature. As Skinner (1945) put it: 
The individual’s response to an inflamed tooth, 
for example, is unlike the response which any-
one else can make to that particular tooth, since 
no one else can make the same kind of contact 
with it… With respect to each individual, in 
other words, a small part of the universe is pri-
vate (p. 257).
There is debate about private events as 
Skinner conceived them in a science of behavior 
(see for instance, Baum, 2011; Hocutt, 2009; 
Palmer, 2009; Rachlin, 2003, 2011). In a paper 
about privacy according to Skinner, Creel (1980) 
distinguished between potentially accessible and 
forever inaccessible or subjective private events. 
A researcher with the proper instruments could 
observe a potentially accessible event, but no-
body would observe a subjective private event. 
Though the technology for observing sounds 
and images inside a person’s head belongs, for 
the time being, to the realm of science fiction, 
it is a plausible technology. Those sounds and 
images exemplify potentially accessible events. 
Pain, pleasure, joy, and sadness exemplify sub-
jective private events because nobody will ever 
experience others’ pains or pleasures. According 
to Creel (1980), the notion of privacy for Skinner 
covered potentially accessible as well as subjec-
tive private events (see also Tourinho, 2009).
Most behavior analysts today accept Skin-
ner’s stance on privacy. Virtually all of them ac-
cept the existence of potentially accessible private 
events, but some are not as willing to accept the ex-
istence of subjective private events. For instance, 
Palmer (2011) said, “privacy is a circumstantial 
property of behavior, and we can dismiss priva-
cy in principle for our considerations” (p. 203). 
By privacy in principle Palmer meant “events 
that must forever remain hidden… whatever 
the tools of the scientist” (p. 203), which implies 
that he would not accept in a science of behav-
ior what Creel called subjective events, which 
will remain forever private. Moore (1995, 2001), 
on the contrary, argued that accepting subjec-
tive private events in a science of behavior is 
precisely a fundamental characteristic of the 
radical behaviorism that Skinner advocated. It is 
worth noting that Watson’s implicit stimuli and 
responses are equivalent to Creel’s potential ac-
cessible private events. 
In synthesis, Skinner shared Watson’s 
core argument about psychology as a science 
of behavior. Both argued for behavior as the 
subject matter of psychology, rejected mental 
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explanations, and adopted an environmental de-
terminism. Neither Skinner nor Watson denied 
the importance of the organism, and both ar-
gued for historical factors in explaining behavior 
by relying on learning to explain new responses. 
Watson denied a place for consciousness and 
immediate subjective experience in a science of 
behavior, while Skinner argued that a complete 
science of behavior should deal with subjective 
experience. Although Skinner moved away from 
an S-R psychology, his commitment to a molec-
ular analysis might have preserved something of 
the S-R logic in his conception of behavior.
Behavior in Molar Behaviorism
As I did with Watson’s and Skinner’s behav-
iorism, I will now offer a very simplified version 
of what some authors call molar behaviorism 
(see Baum, 2002; 2011). Molar behaviorists ar-
gue that activities or extended temporal patterns 
of behavior compose the Psyche. In general, 
molar behaviorism shares the basics with Skin-
ner, and claims to follow him (see for instance, 
Baum, 2002; Rachlin, 1992). Like Watson and 
Skinner, molar behaviorists argue for behavior 
as the proper subject matter of psychology and 
the environment as the place to look for the rel-
evant independent variables. Like Skinner, they 
assume that psychology studies organism-envi-
ronment transactions that occur under a process 
analogous to Darwin’s natural selection. Never-
theless, they differ in the scope of the analysis. 
The concern of Skinner was the equivalent to 
the molecule: the Sd-R-Sr unit. In contrast, mo-
lar behaviorists’ concern is aggregated and ex-
tended patterns of behavior (Baum, 2002). One 
could say that, although Skinner cared for the 
forest and trees, his emphasis was on the trees. 
Molar behaviorists also care for the forest and 
trees, but their emphasis is on the forest.
To illustrate what patterns and activities 
are for molar behaviorists, I will examine three 
situations in the Skinner box. In situation 1, 
food and water are freely available. Under these 
conditions, the rat spends its 24 hours eating, 
drinking, exploring, grooming, and sleeping; the 
rat allocates its time among the things that it can 
do inside the box, and its allocation of time is its 
pattern of behavior. The entire amount of eating, 
drinking, or exploring, is a pattern. Eventually, 
the rat presses the lever, but that lever pressing 
belongs to the exploratory pattern. Lever press-
ing in these circumstances is low. In situation 2, 
the rat obtains pellets by pressing the lever. Now, 
it allocates more time to lever pressing and less 
to other activities, and if the number of lever 
presses required for obtaining a pellet increases, 
the rat allocates even more time to lever pressing 
and less to other activities. 
In situation 3, the rat can obtain pellets by 
pressing any of two levers. Under these condi-
tions, the time that the rat allocates to the origi-
nal lever will depend not only on the pellets that 
it obtains with that lever but also on the pellets 
that it obtains with the other. Modifying the 
contingency for one lever changes the amount 
of time that the rat spends on the other. If both 
levers require a fixed number of responses to de-
liver a pellet, the rat presses only the lever with 
the lowest ratio. If both levers deliver pellets after 
unpredictable time intervals, the rat presses both 
levers, distributing them in accordance to the 
amount of pellets that each lever delivers -what 
Herrnstein (1961, 1970) called the matching law 
because the responding rate tends to match the 
reinforcement rate.
Whereas for Watson behavior was a phe-
nomenon composed of discrete responses, 
for molar behaviorists, behavior is a continu-
ous phenomenon. Time is the only dimension 
common to all the activities that human and 
nonhuman animals can do, so duration is a 
measurement that allows comparisons of dif-
ferent activities such as eating and grooming or 
drinking and sleeping. Whereas, for instance, 
it is appropriate to compare lever-pressing re-
sponse rate in one lever to response rate in the 
other, it would be inappropriate to compare the 
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response rate of grooming to the response rate 
of lever pressing because the activities have very 
different topographies. In the case of human 
activities, comparing the response rate of listen-
ing to classical music to that of jogging in the 
park does not make much sense, but comparing 
the time spent listening to music to that spent 
jogging makes sense. Hence, molar behavior-
ists record the time that human and nonhuman 
animals spend on those activities that their en-
vironment allows them to carry out in order to 
estimate time allocation, which is a continuous 
variable (see Baum, 2002). 
According to Watson, to understand the 
meaning or function of a response, a psycholo-
gist must identify the controlling stimulus, and 
according to Skinner, the controlling conse-
quences. In contrast, molar behaviorists argue 
that to understand the meaning or function of 
an instance of behavior, a psychologist must put 
the response in the context of the larger pat-
tern of which it is a part. In situation 1 above, 
lever pressing was part of exploratory behavior 
whereas in situations 2 and 3 it was part of feed-
ing behavior. As the three situations illustrated, 
changes in behavior resulted from changes in 
the environment. In situation 1, the rat acted 
without restrictions and distributed its time 
freely among the available activities. In situa-
tion 2, feeding was not free any more. It became 
conditional, or contingent, on lever pressing so 
that the rat increased lever-pressing time and 
decreased other activities’ time. In situation 3, 
changes in one of the contingencies affect the 
other contingency. 
A molar analysis has implications for the 
role of private events, subjectivity, and the psy-
chological phenomena associated with them in 
a science of behavior. Molar behaviorists have 
argued against the use of internal events and 
have rejected subjective private events openly 
(see for instance, Baum, 2011; Rachlin, 2003). As 
Baum (2011) put it, “private events are irrelevant 
to understanding the function of behavior, that 
is, activities in relation to environmental events” 
(p. 186). There are at least two reasons for which 
authors, like Watson, have appealed to internal 
stimuli and responses. First, to account for situ-
ations in which there is no close temporal con-
nection between the stimulus and the response. 
In Watson’s example of two people setting an 
appointment, he recurred to internal sub-vocal 
verbal stimuli to fill the gap between the pres-
ent verbal stimulus and the next day’s meeting. 
If there seems to be no external stimuli produc-
ing a response, internal stimuli may do the task. 
Nonetheless, internal or private stimuli and re-
sponses are by the time being inferences. 
Second, internal events account for sub-
jective phenomena like feelings and thinking. 
From a molar perspective, even accepting the 
existence of Creel’s (1980) subjective private 
events, the phenomena relevant for a science of 
behavior are always publicly observable because 
patterns are observable in principle. A depressed 
person, for instance, might eventually have sui-
cidal thoughts inaccessible to other people, but 
the depressive pattern is clearly accessible. The 
suicidal thought is an episode equivalent to a 
tree in the forest or to an isolated pressing of the 
lever in the Skinner box. By observing a single 
instance of lever pressing, a researcher would 
not be able to tell if the rat is responding to a 
schedule or exploring, even if a pellet follows the 
response. If the technology to hear what people 
say when talking to themselves were available, 
and the observed person says “I will kill myself ”, 
one cannot conclude anything because the frag-
ment could be part of a joke, a memory of a text, 
a suicidal statement, and so on. To reach a con-
clusion, observing the pattern is necessary. 
In synthesis, molar behaviorists believe, 
along with Watson and Skinner, that behavior is 
the Psyche, that the environment determines be-
havior, and that mentalism does not account for 
behavior. Like Skinner, molar behaviorists think 
that the environment acts on the organism with 
a process analogous to natural selection, but the 
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selection is of patterns rather than of responses. 
For molar behaviorist, choice is fundamental, 
so to explain the nature of a particular activity, 
information regarding the other available ac-
tivities is fundamental. As Rachlin (2011) put it, 
molar behaviorism “views mental life in terms of 
the interaction over time between the environ-
ment and the organism as a whole” (p. 210). 
Conclusion
More than 50 years ago, in a critique of 
Watson’s behaviorism, Bergman (1956) said, 
“Virtually every American psychologist, wheth-
er he knows it or not, is nowadays a method-
ological behaviorist. That goes for those who 
glorify John B. Watson as well as for those who 
belittle him” (p. 270).
Bergman’s statement is still valid. Most psy-
chologists in the world, whether they accept it 
or not, are methodological behaviorists because 
their basic data is some form of measurable 
behavior. Watson’s behaviorism was one of the 
several kinds of methodological behaviorism 
that, according to Moore (2001), have existed. 
For most methodological behaviorists, however, 
behavior is not the Psyche, but the way to reach 
it. According to Bergman (1956), the main con-
tribution of Watson to psychology was meth-
odological and “merely a footnote… though 
a most important one” (p. 268). Perhaps his 
contribution has not been fairly valued. I think 
that arguing that behavior is the proper subject 
matter of psychology was his main contribution, 
which was neither as small as a footnote nor as 
important and solid as the system that Skinner 
created. Today, psychology as Skinner conceived 
is the dominant behavioral paradigm, but as the 
advent of molar behaviorism indicates, the no-
tion of behavior as the Psyche has been and will 
keep changing. 
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